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Howwas the evolution of our unique biological life history related
to distinctive human developments in cognition and culture? We
suggest that the extended human childhood and adolescence
allows a balance between exploration and exploitation, between
wider and narrower hypothesis search and between innovation
and imitation in cultural learning. In particular, different develop-
mental periods may be associated with different learning strate-
gies. This relation between biology and culture was probably
co-evolutionary and bidirectional – life history changes allowed
changes in learning, which in turn both allowed and rewarded
extended life histories. In two studies, we test how easily people
learn an unusual physical or social causal relation from a pattern of
evidence.We track the development of this ability from early child-
hood through adolescence and adulthood. In the physical domain,
preschoolers, counter-intuitively, perform better than school-aged
children, who in turn perform better than adolescents and adults.
As they grow older learners are less ﬂexible, they are less likely
to adopt an initially unfamiliar hypothesis that is consistent with
new evidence. Instead, they prefer a familiar hypothesis that is less
consistent with the evidence. In the social domain, both preschool-
ers and adolescents are actually the most ﬂexible learners, adopt-
ing an unusual hypothesis more easily than either 6-year-olds
or adults. There may be important developmental transitions in
ﬂexibility at the entry into middle childhood and in adolescence.
Causal reasoning j Social cognition j Cognitive development j Adoles-
cence j Life history
Introduction
One of the most distinctive biological features of human beings
is our unusual life history. Compared to our closest primate
relatives we have a dramatically extended childhood including an
exceptionally long middle childhood and adolescence. Moreover,
humans have shorter inter-birth intervals than our closest pri-
mate relatives, producing an even greater number of less capable
children (1). There is evidence for other human adaptations that
helped cope with this flood of needy young. In contrast to our
closest primate relatives, human children enjoy the benefits of
care from three sources in addition to biological mothers: pair-
bonded fathers (2), alloparents (3) and post-menopausal women
– grandmothers (4).
It may seem evolutionarily paradoxical that humans would
have developed a life history that includes such expensive and
vulnerable young for such a long period. However, across many
different species, including birds, and both placental and mar-
supial mammals, there is a very general (though not perfect)
correlation between relative brain size, intelligence and a reliance
on learning, and an extended period of immaturity (5,6). This
suggests a relation between our distinctive human life history
and our equally distinctive large brains and reliance on learning,
particularly cultural learning. Such a relation between biology and
culture would have been co-evolutionary and bidirectional – life
history changes allowed changes in cultural learning, which in
turn both allowed and rewarded extended life histories. In this
way, culture could have extended biology.
A number of researchers have suggested that our life history
is related to our learning abilities (7-9). But what might this
relation be like in more detail? It is possible that the extended
human childhood and adolescence is simply a waiting period in
which a large brain can grow or cultural learning can take place
(10). However, both developmental psychology and neuroscience
suggest that theremay bemore substantive differences in learning
and plasticity in different developmental periods – differences
that could contribute to human intelligence and culture.
We argue that there may be a developmental trade-off be-
tween cognitive abilities that allow organisms to learn the struc-
ture of a new physical or social environment, abilities that are
characteristic of children, and the more adult abilities that allow
skilled action on a familiar environment. Empirical evidence
suggests that children may sometimes be better, and particularly
more flexible, learners than adults. Ideas from the literatures
on developmental neuroscience, machine learning and cultural
learning may help to characterize and explain these developmen-
tal differences more precisely.
We go on to test these ideas by examining cognitive flex-
ibility across the developmental periods of preschool, middle-
childhood, adolescence and adulthood, in both the physical and
social domain.
When younger learners do better
Younger learners usually have more difficulty with cogni-
tive tasks than older children and adults. Young children have
characteristic deficits in executive function, working memory,
attentional focus and control (11,12). These are precisely the
same abilities required for performing complex skilled actions
swiftly and effectively in adulthood. Indeed, human children are
so dependent on others partly because of their deficits in these
areas.
However, at the same time that their executive abilities are
so limited, human children learn a tremendous amount about the
world easily and rapidly. They quickly and spontaneously learn
about the causal structure of their physical and social environ-











































































































































Fig. 1. Schematic of the procedure for Experiment 1. The yellow rectangle
represents the machine’s activation. “Disjunctive” training provides evidence
of the more common, disjunctive hypothesis. “Conjunctive” training provides
support for the less common conjunctive hypothesis. “Test” trials presented
ambiguous evidence about the ‘D’ object.
Fig. 2. Average attribution scores by age group and conditionwith standard
errors.
Fig. 3. Proportion of participants labeling test objects as ‘blickets’ with
standard errors.
ments, constructing intuitive theories of the physical, biological
and psychological world. (e.g. 13).
There is also empirical evidence that younger learners some-
times, counter-intuitively, actually outperform older ones on
learning tasks, showing more flexibility. Younger mice learn to
reverse a learned rule more easily than post-pubertal mice (14).
Oldermonkeys show neural plasticity when they learn an auditory
or tactile pattern, but only when the pattern is relevant to their
Fig. 4. Proportion of participants choosing either single or multiple items
for intervention choice with standard errors.
goals –juveniles extract the patterns and demonstrate plasticity
independently of goals (15). Among humans, younger learners
are more able to learn new linguistic distinctions than older
learners (16, 17) and they are better at imagining new uses for
a tool (18). Younger children also remember information that is
utside the focus of goal-directed attention better than adults and
older children (19, 20).
We have recently found that preschool children also outper-
form older children and adults on abstract social (21) and physical
(22) causal learning problems (23). In particular, younger learn-
ers are more likely to infer an initially unlikely causal hypothesis
from a pattern of evidence. These kinds of causal learning are
especially relevant for human evolution. Theories of the evolution
of cognition stress the adaptive value of human abilities to learn
both the psychological and social causal relationships that are
involved in “theory of mind” and “Machiavellian intelligence” and
the physical causal relationships that underpin tool use (24, 25).
These findings suggest empirically that children might be
especially flexible learners. But why would this be?
Neuroscience: Trade-offs between executive function and
plasticity
Neuroscientists have investigated the origins of both the in-
creased executive control and decreased plasticity that come with
age. One set of developments involves synaptic changes. In the
early period of developmentmanymore new synaptic connections
are made than in adulthood. With age some of these neural con-
nections are strengthened but others are pruned, transforming a
more flexible, sensitive and plastic brain into a more effective and
controlled one. (26,27).
Increasing executive control is also related to the develop-
ment of prefrontal areas of the brain and their increasing con-
nection to other brain areas. However, neuroscientists have also
argued that strong frontal control has costs for exploration and
learning (28). Interference with prefrontal control areas through
TMS leads to a wider range of responses on a “divergent thinking”
task (29), and during learning there is a characteristic release of
frontal control (30).
The adolescent brain undergoes particular changes. There
is significant maturational development in prefrontal areas and
in areas thought to be involved in self-perception and social
cognition (31), which may indicate increased plasticity. However,
there is also evidence for enhanced consolidation and pruning in
adolescence (32), which might suggest a period of less flexibility.
Computation: Trade-offs between exploitation and explo-
ration, and narrow and broad search
The trade-off between executive function and plasticity in
the neuroscience literature parallels another trade-off that ap-











































































































































make an important distinction between periods of exploration,
in which the system gathers information about potential actions
and outcomes, and exploitation, in which information gathering
is replaced by taking the actions most likely to maximize reward
(33). Human life histories can be interpreted as a unique solution
to the explore/exploit tension, with low executive control and
high plasticity early in life maximizing exploration, and increased
executive function and lower plasticity maximizing reward as we
switch to exploitation.
The different strategies that learners might engage in – and
their consequences for those learners – can also be characterized
more precisely by considering cognitive development from the
perspective of a probabilistic model approach to cognition. This
approach, inspired by statistical methods that are widely used in
artificial intelligence and machine learning, has become increas-
ingly influential in cognitive science (e.g. 34-39).
This approach applies particularly naturally to learning the
causal structure of the environment. Probabilistic models of cog-
nition use sophisticated causal models to specify the probability
of observing a particular statistical pattern of evidence if a causal
hypothesis is true (40, 41). This makes it possible to use Bayesian
inference to determine the probability that the hypothesis is true
given that evidence. Rather than simply generating a yes or no
decision about whether a particular hypothesis is true, Bayesian
inference evaluates multiple hypotheses and assign probabilities
to those hypotheses (13, 34-39).Many studies have presented chil-
drenwith evidence patterns and alternative hypotheses thatmight
explain those patterns, and found that children characteristically
choose hypotheses that Bayesian inference suggests should be
more probable (13).
However, Bayesian inference comes at a cost – the significant
computational cost of evaluating hypotheses. It is impossible for
any system, human or computer, to consider and compare all
the possible hypotheses relevant to a realistic learning problem.
Computer scientists and statisticians often use “sampling” to help
solve this problem – stochastically selecting some hypotheses
rather than others – and there is evidence that people, including
young children, do something similar (42-44).
The sampling process, however, presents learners with a
dilemma. A learner can conduct a narrow search, only revising
current hypotheses when the evidence is particularly strong and
making small adjustments to accommodate new evidence. This
strategy is most likely to quickly yield a “good enough” solution
that will support immediate effective action. But it also means
that the learner may miss a better alternative that is farther from
the current hypothesis, such as a hypothesis about an unusual
causal relation.
Alternatively, a learner can conduct a more exploratory
search, moving to new hypotheses with only a small amount of
evidence, and trying out hypotheses that are less like the current
hypotheses. This strategy is less efficient if the learner’s starting
hypothesis is reasonably good, and may mean that the learner
wastes time considering unlikely possibilities. But it may also
make the learner more likely to adopt genuinely new solutions.
There is a related contrast in the algorithms that are used in
computer science. Drawing on an analogy to statistical physics,
computer scientists have explored the consequences of using
narrower “low temperature” versus broader “high temperature”
searches. Continuing the analogy, “simulated annealing” (45) is
one of the best ways of resolving the tension between these
two strategies. Learners who begin with a broader higher-
temperature search and gradually move to a narrower low-
temperature search, are most likely to find the optimal solu-
tion, just as in metallurgy heating a metal and then cooling
it leads to the most robust structure. Moreover, as in physical
cases of annealing, there may be multiple rounds of this process.
We have argued for a similar developmental pattern with early
broad exploratory sampling followed by later narrower search
(22, 23). Our hypothesis is that childhood and adolescence may
be evolution’s way of performing simulated annealing, and hence
resolving the explore/exploit tradeoff.
Cultural learning: Trade-offs between imitation and innova-
tion
The causal learning problems where children do better can
also be recast as cultural learning problems, and understood in
relation to the cultural learning literature. Consider a learner who
observes someone else performing a complicated series of actions
with artifacts that produce an effect. The learner might approach
this information in several ways. First, the learner might simply
reproduce the actions in detail. Alternatively, the learner might
apply existing causal knowledge to the situation, and bring about
the effect more directly. These two forms of learning have been
the focus of the extensive “over-imitation” literature, starting with
the classic Whiten & Horner study (46).
Human preschoolers are sensitive to information about phys-
ical events and actor’s intentions in deciding how faithfully to
imitate and there are also developmental and cultural differences
in how imitation takes place (47-50) Learners of all ages may
use their existing causal and cultural knowledge to interpret
the actions of another person and to decide whether and how
faithfully to imitate those actions.
But they might also use another person’s demonstration to
discover a new or unexpected causal relationship. For example,
consider a Pleistocene learner who sees an expert produce a flake
from one side of a rock by hitting it on the other side (51), or a
modern learner who watches an expert swipe to find a photo on
a phone. The learner might simply imitate the demonstrator ex-
actly. Alternatively, she might use her existing causal knowledge
to bring about the result (hitting the rock at the place where she
wants it to flake, or using a keyboard command).
But a learner might also use this information to infer an
unexpected abstract causal principle (distant force or touch ac-
tivation). She could then use this principle to design innovative
actions beyond the demonstration, shaping other tools or trying
other swipes for other commands. This kind of learning would
both enable learners to adopt innovations in an intelligent way,
and to create innovations themselves.
This also applies to social and psychological causal learning.
Imagine that a learner hears a complex narrative describing a
series of human actions, again a classic cultural, as well as causal,
learning scenario. The learner might simply encode the actions as
they are described, recording what the actors did. She might in-
terpret those actions in terms of an existing psychological schema.
Alternatively, she might use the information in the narrative to
infer new psychological or social relations.
As in the physical case, this last option might lead to both
the adoption and creation of social and psychological innovations.
Consider a learner who hears a story in which Sam and John live
together and share a bedroom. She might interpret this story in
terms of her existing cultural schemas (perhaps Sam and John are
close friends with a small apartment). She might also, however,
use the story to make a broader inference about the possibility of
same-sex marriage.
These alternative forms of cultural learning exemplify the
explore/exploit tension. The first two strategies, exactly imitate
or rely on prior causal knowledge, are likely to lead to quick
and mostly effective actions. Entertaining the unlikely new causal
relation is both more cognitively demanding and more risky. In
the long run, however, it may confer an advantage in dealing with
changing and variable environments.
Human learners of all ages may use all these strategies to
some extent. However, our hypothesis is that learners at different
developmental stages may be more or less likely to use different











































































































































variable younger learners may be more likely to adopt new hy-
potheses than older learners. In fact, the causal learning tasks in
our earlier research, in which younger learners do better than
older ones involve precisely these kinds of scenarios. Learners
infer a new causal relation from a demonstration or narrative.
This developmental difference may also help resolve the
tension between imitation and innovation in cultural learning
(47). Human children are adept at imitation. But the flexibility
of childhood cognition may also help allow innovations to be
adopted and to spread. Young children are rarely the source of
complex technical innovations -- actually designing and producing
an effective tool, for example, is a challenging task that requires
both innovation and executive skill (47,52). However, innovations
that are effortful and rare when they first appear within a genera-
tion can become effortlessly and widely adopted by the next gen-
eration. In fact, among non-human animals, cultural innovations
are often first produced, adopted and spread by juveniles (53,54).
Continuous knowledge acquisition vs. discontinuous devel-
opmental transition.
There are two complementary mechanisms that might lead to
a developmental shift from broader exploration to narrower ex-
ploitation. One is simply the accumulation of knowledge itself. As
we learn more and growmore confident in our beliefs, we are less
likely to change those beliefs. From a Bayesian perspective, de-
velopment proceeds from a relatively “flat” prior, where different
hypotheses have more similar probabilities, to a more “peaked”
distribution, where some hypotheses are much more likely than
others, as a learner accumulates knowledge. In Bayesian models
a flatter prior would automatically lead to broader search.
Another complementary possibility, building on the literature
discussed above, is thatmaturation and general experience lead to
different degrees of plasticity and flexibility, and different search
strategies, independent of accumulated knowledge. There might
be non-linear changes at points of developmental transition, such
as the transition from early to middle childhood at around 6
or in adolescence, rather than a simple continuous change with
accumulated knowledge.
In particular, although adolescents have more accumulated
experience than younger children, there is evidence, as noted
above, that adolescence may also be a period of enhanced plas-
ticity and learning (55,56) especially for social domains (31,57), in
part through the privileging of social information processing and
the salience of social rewards in decisionmaking (58,59). Cultural
innovations such as new socially significant forms of language,
dress or music often first appear in adolescents. Adolescence
might be an extra round of annealing in the social sphere. How-
ever, there is also evidence that adolescence may be a period of
pruning and consolidation.
In fact, two contrasting developmental patterns characterize
adolescence (60, 61). On some measures, such as cognitive con-
trol, and self-regulation, there is a relatively linear trajectory from
childhood through adolescence to adulthood. On others such
as sensation-seeking and risk-taking, both forms of exploration,
there is a marked increase associated with the onset of puberty,
and an inverted U pattern peaking in adolescence and then
declining. There is extensive research on risk-taking and decision-
making in adolescence, but to our knowledge, no research on
causal learning.
Current Studies We approach these questions by extending
two earlier causal learning experiments. Where the original ex-
periments contrasted preschoolers with either six-year-old chil-
dren or adults, we report results covering the entire develop-
mental span from preschool to adulthood, with special focus on
the transition to middle childhood and adolescence, periods not
explored previously. This allows us to explore learning across
human life history, and to ask whether there are distinctive de-
velopmental transitions.
Both experiments have the same logic. We contrast two hy-
potheses about how objects or people work, one that is initially
more likely, at least for adults, and one that is more unusual. In
Experiment 1, we contrast the hypothesis that individual objects
activate a machine with the hypothesis that particular combina-
tions of objects do. In Experiment 2, we contrast the hypothesis
that someone took a risk because of their personal traits with the
hypothesis that they took the risk because of the situation they
encountered.
In one condition, participants receive covariation evidence
that supports the likely hypothesis. In a second, otherwise iden-
tical condition, they receive covariation evidence that supports
the unlikely hypothesis. In a third, baseline, condition, they do
not receive evidence either way. We record whether participants
of different ages adopt the likely or unlikely hypothesis in each
condition.
The different conditions allow us to control for alternative
factors that might influence performance on these tasks. In the
first two conditions, supporting the likely hypothesis or the un-
likely one, the participants see similar agents perform similar ac-
tions on similar objects – all that differs is the covariation between
causes and effects. Moreover, both conditions require that the
learner attend to and use the particular pattern of data presented
in the demonstration. Whether they adopt the likely or unlikely
hypothesis, the learner still has to attend to the specific details
of the evidence to answer correctly. Differences in performance
then, should reflect differences in causal learning rather than
more general information-processing, linguistic or motivational
factors.
Experiment 1: Reasoning about the causes of physical events
In an earlier study, Lucas et al. (2014), a group of us found
that, across three different experiments, with different partici-
pants and designs, preschool children learned an unusual abstract
physical causal relationship but adults had difficulty (22).
In Experiment 2 of that study, preschool children and adults
were presented with a machine that lights up when you place
certain patterns of blocks on top, and were told that “blicketness”
makes the machine go. First, in a training trial, participants saw
unambiguous covariation evidence suggesting that the machine
operated according to a general logical rule. In one condition,
the machine operated on a disjunctive “or” rule: each block either
activated the machine or did not. Accounts of adult causal rea-
soning suggest that this disjunctive rule is the default assumption
for adults (e.g. 62). In the other condition, the machine operated
on a more unusual conjunctive “and” rule -- two blocks had to
be placed on the machine at the same time to make it activate.
4-year-old children and adults in both conditions then saw an am-
biguous test trial with new blocks that was consistent with either
general principle. In a baseline condition, participants only saw
the ambiguous trial without the training trials. In each condition,
participants were then asked whether each block was or was not
a “blicket” and were asked to activate the machine.
Children learned the appropriate general rule in each con-
dition, and applied it to the ambiguous case. Adults applied the
default disjunctive rule in the ambiguous case even when the
earlier evidence weighed against it.
In Experiment 1 we used exactly the same methods across
the entire developmental range including 6-7 year olds, 9-11 year
olds, and 12-14 year olds. Figure 2 provides a visual display of the
pattern of evidence used for training and test trials.
We extended the contrast between preschoolers and adults
to include school-aged children and adolescents. This allowed
us to examine the transitions from early to middle childhood,
from middle childhood to adolescence, and from adolescence to
adulthood. Would there be differences between preschoolers and
school-age children?Would adolescents be less flexible and more











































































































































dren and adults with the inverted U pattern? Finally, would there
be a continuous change as children accumulated more knowledge
or more discontinuous changes at developmental transitions?
Results
Blicket judgments:We combined new data collected from younger
school-age children (6-7-year-olds), older pre-adolescent chil-
dren (9-11) and young adolescents (12-14-year-olds) with the data
from 4-year-olds and adults tested with the identical method in
Lucas et al. (2014).
If the observers believe the machine operates on an unusual
conjunctive rule, requiring multiple blickets to operate, they
should say that F, D and possibly E are blickets and use multiple
objects to make the machine go. If observers believe that the
machine works on the “disjunctive” rule, in contrast, they should
say that F is a blicket but that D and E are not and put single
objects on the machine. (The evidence that E is a blicket is less
strong than the evidence for D so participants should be less
likely to say that E is a blicket than D (Lucas et al 2014), see SI
Appendix Table S5 for analysis of E judgments consistent with
these predictions).
Fisher’s exact tests revealed no significant differences be-
tween conditions or ages for the unambiguous F object –as pre-
dicted all the age groups in all the conditions said that F was a
blicket (means ranged from .7 to .96).
Figure 2 presents the proportion of participants in each age
group labeling the critical D test object as a blicket by condition.
Since the dependent measure is a binary response we used com-
parisons of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) to identify the
statistical model with the best fit to the data. Results of model
comparisons can be found in the Supplementary Information
Appendix Table S4.
A model predicting the binary D judgment from condition
and age group with no interactions was best fit to the data. Post-
hoc tests using Tukey’s Honest Significant Differences (HSD) for
‘D’ object judgments revealed a significant difference between the
conjunctive (M = 0.52, SE = 0.02) and the disjunctive (M = 0.13,
SE = 0.01; t = -0.391, p < .001) and baseline (M = 0.15, SE =
0.01; t = -0.374, p < .001) conditions and there was no significant
difference between the conjunctive and baseline conditions (t =
-0.017, p = 0.923).
In addition to the model comparisons, we conducted planned
comparisons for the theoretically crucial developmental contrasts
in the critical conjunctive condition, using Fisher’s exact tests.
These were the transition to school-age (4 versus 6-year-olds) and
to adolescence (12-14-year-olds versus 6-7 and 9-11 year olds,
and versus adults). 4-year-olds (M = 0.92, SE = 0.01) were
significantly more likely to label ‘D’ a blicket than 6-7 year olds
(M = 0.56, SE = 0.02; p < .01). 6-7-year-olds and 9-11-year-
olds (M = 0.6, SE = 0.02; p = 1) did not differ but both 6-7
and 9-11 year olds labeled ‘D’ as a blicket significantly more than
12-14-year-olds (M = 0.28, SE = 0.02; p < .05, in both cases).
However, adolescents (12-14-year-olds) judgments did not differ
significantly from the judgments of adults (M = 0.25, SE = 0.02;
p = 1).
Thus within the new data collected in this study, we saw some
evidence for both middle childhood and adolescent transitions.
We also analyzed participants’ choices when they were asked
to activate themachine. Figure 3 displays the proportion of partic-
ipants choosing multiple items, indicating that they thought more
than one object was necessary to activate the machine. There
was more variability in this open-ended response than in the yes-
no blicket judgments. However, the general pattern was similar.
In particular, adolescents and adults were more likely to choose
single objects to make the machine go, suggesting that they had
genuinely concluded that the machine worked disjunctively, and
did not simply use the word “blicket” differently than younger
participants.
Again, we used aGLM (see SI Appendix Table S6 for details).
The model with the best fit to the data predicted the single vs
multiple object use from condition, age group and the interaction
between condition and age group.
As with the blicket judgment measure, we made planned
comparisons for the conjunctive condition using Fisher’s exact
tests, focusing on the school-aged and adolescent transitions.
These tests showed that 4-year-olds (M = 0.84, SE = 0.01) were
more likely to use multiple objects to activate the machine than
6-7-year-olds (M = 0.53, SE = 0.02; p < .05), again suggesting a
middle childhood transition.With thismeasure, 6-7-year-olds and
9-11-year-olds (M = 0.63, SE = 0.02) did not differ significantly
from 12-14-year-olds and adolescents did not differ significantly
from adults.
Discussion
These results suggest that, in this task, as learners grow older
and have more experience they become less sensitive to the
evidence andmore reliant on their prior beliefs. They increasingly
prefer disjunctive explanations to conjunctive ones, even when
the evidence weighs in the opposite direction.
The results from both the blicket judgments and interventions
suggest a developmental transition at the entry to middle child-
hood and the blicket judgment results also suggest a transition at
adolescence, rather than just a continuous change with increasing
knowledge. School-aged children are similar to each other and
less flexible than preschoolers, Adolescents and adults are similar,
and both are less flexible than preschoolers and school-aged
children.
Experiment 2: Reasoning about the causes of actions
In the second experiment we turned from physical causality
to social and psychological causality. Classic findings in social
psychology show that Western adults attribute actions to the
stable internal personal traits of an actor in spite of countervailing
evidence -- the “fundamental attribution error” (63). They rely on
existing causal hypotheses rather than modifying those hypothe-
ses in the face of evidence.
In one study, for example, an experimenter instructed half
the participants in a group to write and read aloud an essay
supporting Castro and the other half to write and read an essay
opposing him. In spite of the obvious evidence that the essays
were the result of the situation, participants reported that people
in the first group were more left wing than those in the second
(64). Among adults, this trait bias tends to become stronger
with age (65) and it appears to be stronger in some cultures
than others – American and European middle-class participants
show a stronger trait bias than Hong Kong, Mainland Chinese,
Japanese and Korean participants (66).
How does this bias develop in childhood? Seiver et al. (21)
presented preschool children with a scenario in which two dolls
either played or refused to play on two potentially risky toys.
The covariation evidence supported either a person or situation
attribution. Then they asked the children to explain why the actors
played or refused to play on the toys. 4-year-olds accurately made
person or situation attributions depending on the evidence. 6-
year-olds, however, showed a trait bias. They made more person
attributions than 4-year-olds even when the covariation informa-
tion supported a situation attribution. In Experiment 1 we extend
this previous work to study the developmental changes in learning
over childhood and adolescence.
We included an adult sample to ensure that adults would
indeed show a trait bias in this task. Adding 9-11 year old and 12-
14 year old samples let us test whether the previously discovered
transition from 4 to 6 was part of a continuous developmental











































































































































We could also examine adolescence. Like adults, adolescents
have extensive experience of their particular culture and the trait
assumptions that go with it. There might be a developmental pro-
gression towards the adult pattern, as in Experiment 1. However,
adolescents also are especially sensitive to social information and
strongly motivated to explain peer behavior (55). They might be
more sensitive to social evidence, and more likely to override a
trait bias than adults. We might then expect something more like
the inverted U of risk-taking and sensation-seeking.
Results
We combined data from 9-11 year olds, 12-14 year olds and adults
with the data from preschoolers and 6-year-old children pre-
sented in Seiver et al. (2013). We recorded how often participants
explained the dolls’ actions in terms of situations -- the initially
unlikely hypothesis -- and used this to assign a “situation” score
from 0 to 2. Figure 1 shows performance across age in the “person”
condition, where the evidence supports a trait attribution, the
“situation” condition where the evidence supports a situation
attribution, and a baseline condition, which didn’t support either
explanation. Linear regression analyses were used to predict the
attribution score from age group and condition
Model comparisons showed that the model with the best fit
to the data predicted situation attribution score from age group,
and condition, as well as interactions between the two variables
(F (14, 525) = 15.43, p < .001, Adjusted R2 = 0.273), details of
the model comparisons can be found in SI Appendix Table S12).
Figure 1 plots the average situation attribution score for each age
group by condition.
As in Experiment 1 we also performed planned compar-
isons for the crucial age transitions in the situation condition,
using t tests. The critical situation condition revealed whether
participants would adopt the unlikely situation hypothesis given
evidence, or would instead attribute actions to traits as they did
in the person and baseline conditions.
In the Seiver et al. data the 6-year-olds, but not the 4-year-
olds showed a trait bias in the situation condition, suggesting a
transition at school age. In this experiment, we also tested the
adolescent transition by comparing the 12-14 year olds to 6- and
9-year-olds and to adults. The adolescents showed an interesting
pattern, unlike the pattern in Experiment 1, which appeared to
be responsible for the interaction effect in the model. Adolescent
responses in the situation condition differed both from adults
and younger children, in an inverted U pattern. In the situation
condition 12-14-year-olds (t = -4.1048, p < .001) made more
situation attributions than adults, and 12-14-year-olds also made
significantly more situation attributions than 6-year-olds (t = -
2.34, p = 0.02), though they were not significantly different from
9-11 year olds.
We also performed additional analyses using Tukey’s Honest
Significant Difference (HSD) test. Participants in both the person
(M = 0.2, SE = 0.02; t =-0.531, p < 0.001) and baseline (M
= 0.49, SE = 0.03; t =-0.531, p < 0.001) conditions provided
significantly fewer situation attributions than those in the situation
(M = 1.02, SE = 0.03) condition. There was not a significant
difference between the baseline and person conditions, suggesting
a trait bias.
Given the interaction we also used Tukey’s HSD tests to
examine age differences separately for each condition. There
were no significant age differences in attribution scores in the
person condition – all age groups produced trait explanations
when these explanations were congruent with the data, and rarely
made situation attributions.
The baseline condition allowed us to assess participants’ judg-
ments when no evidence was available, (their “prior” in Bayesian
terms). Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that 4 year-olds (M = 0.93,
SE= 0.08) provided significantly more situation attributions than
both 12-14 year olds (M= 0.24, SE = 0.06; t = -0.694, p = 0.001)
and adults (M = 0.38, SE = 0.05; t = -0.55, p = 0.004). Although
both 6 year olds (M= 0.43, SE= 0.1; t = -0.49, p= 0.09) and 9-11
year olds (M = 0.55, SE = 0.11; t = -0.386, p = 0.49) provided
fewer situation attributions than 4 year olds, these differences did
not reach statistical significance. This suggested that a trait bias
developed around 6 and was maintained with age.
Discussion
In the person condition participants of all ages mostly made trait
attribution explanations, in accordance with the evidence. In the
baseline condition, with no evidence, there was a decrease in
situation explanations with age. Accumulating experience may
have led to a trait bias.
In the situation condition, in which the learners had to infer
the unusual hypothesis, there was an interesting developmental
reversal, with an inverse U pattern. 12-14-year-olds were less
likely tomake trait attributions than either six-year-olds or adults.
In other words, although the adolescents had developed a strong
bias to begin with, they overcame that bias when they received
contradictory evidence. The adolescents showed the largest gap
between the baseline condition and the situation condition.
These findings support the idea that adolescents may be
particularly interested in discovering new social possibilities. This
is consistent with the fact that, compared to adults, adolescents
show greater activation in brain regions associated with self-
perception and social cognition (67,68) and that adolescents are
often at the forefront of social change.
Finally, these results suggest that changes in flexibility are not
solely due to the accumulation of knowledge. The adolescents
should have accumulated more knowledge than the younger
children and this was reflected in their trait bias in the baseline
condition. However, the adolescents were also the most flexible
social thinkers – they were most able to overcome prior biases in
the face of new evidence.
General discussion and conclusion
These results support the suggestion that the extended human
period of immaturity allows a period of flexible hypothesis search
in cultural learning. In both studies, we also found some evidence
for developmental transitions, particularly from early to middle
childhood and at adolescence.
The crucial conditions involved cases where the evidence and
the existing hypotheses were in conflict, the conjunctive condition
in Experiment 1 and the situation condition in Experiment 2.
In both studies 4-year-olds and 6-7 year olds were significantly
different in these conditions. In both studies, however, we did not
see significant differences between 6-7 year olds and 9-11 year-
olds.
Similarly, we found evidence for a transition in adolescence
in both studies in these conditions, but this transition went in
opposite directions. In the physical case, in the conjunctive con-
dition adolescents were similar to adults but less flexible than
either 6-year-olds or 9-11 year olds. Like adults, the adolescents
seemed reluctant to revise physical knowledge they had already
acquired. In the social case, however, in the situation condition
adolescents were more flexible than either 6-year-olds or adults.
This is consistent with the idea that adolescents are more tuned
to the social domain than the physical one, and are willing to
entertain new social possibilities.
These findings also raise the question of the interaction be-
tween biological and environmental factors in the unfolding of
life history. The findings in the baseline conditions suggest that
children are gradually accumulating more knowledge and that
this may play a role in the decline of cognitive flexibility.
However, the discontinuous pattern in the conjunctive and
situation conditions suggests that other factors also play a role.











































































































































cent transitions. There may also be more complex interactions
between the changing life experiences that come with differ-
ent developmental stages and hypothesis search and flexibility.
Adolescence is not only a time of biological change, it is also a
time of new social motivation and experience. Similarly, there
is a complex interaction between biological changes at around 6
and experiences such as school in our culture, or more informal
apprenticeships in cultures without formal schooling.
It is also plausible that a playful protected environment may
lead to more flexible, exploratory and childlike learning, even in
adulthood, and that even in childhood, stressful or resource-poor
environments may lead to less flexibility and a more adult-like
emphasis on exploitation (see e.g. 69, 70).
These issues are all worthy of exploration, as are extensions of
these studies to new domains. The physical causal learning results
in Experiment 1 have been replicated in low SES preschoolers
in Peru and the U.S. (71) but more extensive cross-cultural com-
parisons, including the social tasks, and extending to forager and
small-scale agricultural cultures, would also be important. The
current findings do, however, suggest a relation between biology
and culture, in particular, between the distinctive childhood and
adolescence of our life history and our equally distinctive ability
to learn about and create new social and physical environments.
Methods
Data from the new participants in this study can be found on the Open
Science Framework (https://osf.io/) under the proﬁle for Shaun O'Grady.
Experiment 1:
Participants. Children aged 6-7 years old, (N=90), 9-11-years-old (N=90)
and 12-14-years-old (N=86) participated. We combined this new data with
that reported for preschoolers and adults in Experiment 2 of Lucas et al.
(2014) in order to compare performance from preschool to adulthood. For
all participants in both experiments reported here, parents provided written
informed consent while the child participants provided either written assent
(9-14 year olds) or verbal assent (4-7 year olds) in accordance with protocols
approved by the UC Berkeley Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects.
Procedure. Participants from each age group were randomly assigned to
one of three conditions, two training conditions (conjunctive & disjunctive
conditions) and a third condition with no training termed the baseline
condition. In each condition the participants were shown nine different
blocks (A, B, C, A2, B2, C2, D, E, & F). Participants were presented with a
machine and were informed that ‘blicketness’ makes the machine light up
and play music.
In both of the training conditions the experimenter placed individual
blocks or combinations of blocks on the machine in the same order. (see
Fig 2). In the conjunctive condition the machine only activated when the
experimenter placed both A & C on the machine at the same time, providing
evidence that supports a conjunctive rule about the machine’s operation.
In the disjunctive condition the machine activated any time either A or C
were placed on the machine suggesting that only one of the two blocks
was needed. After the two training trials participants saw one test trial with
three new items D, E & F. The test trials provided ambiguous information
that could support either the conjunctive or disjunctive rule (i.e., D & F are
both blickets or just F is a blicket). In the baseline condition, participants were
not given any prior training about the rule for operating the machine but
instead were presented with two ambiguous test trials. We recorded results
from the second test trial but there were no signiﬁcant differences between
them.
The three conditions only differed in the covariation between the blocks
and the machine. In all three conditions, at the end of both training and test
trials, the experimenter pointed to each item individually and asked the par-
ticipant if that item was a blicket or not a blicket. Finally, the experimenter
then gestured to the set of three objects and asked the participant “Which
of these [gesturing to the three test objects] would you use to turn on the
machine?”.
Experiment 2:
Participants. The same 9-11 year olds (N = 90) and 12-14 year olds (N = 86)
in Experiment 1 also participated in this experiment. Order of administration
of the tasks was counterbalanced to avoid interference - there were no order
effects. An additional 240 adult participants were recruited for an online
version of this experiment via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We combined this
data with the original data from Seiver et al. for four and six year olds.
Procedure and Coding. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions in which two dolls interacted with two toys. Subjects
assigned to the situation condition saw two dolls play on one toy four times
and then saw those same dolls avoid playing on a second toy four times. This
pattern of covariation should suggest that something about the situation
caused the pattern of actions. (i.e. ‘her friend played on the bicycle’ or ‘the
trampoline is dangerous’). Those assigned to the person condition saw one
doll play on both toys 4 times while the other doll avoided playing on both
toys four times. This evidence should suggest that the actions resulted from
an inherent trait of the doll, and produce trait-based explanations such as
‘she’s the type of doll that gets scared/brave’ or ‘she knows how to ride a bike’.
Finally, in a baseline condition, participants saw one doll play on one toy four
times while the other doll avoided the other toy four times. Participants in
this condition could not rely on covariation information to make attributions
since they had not seen how each doll acted on the other toy. After they
watched the dolls interact with the toys each participant was asked why each
doll either played or did not play on the second toy.
Explanations referring to an enduring characteristic of the doll were
coded as ‘person’ attributions and were given a score of ‘0’ (e.g. "Because she
might be more brave than the other one.") When an explanation referenced
an aspect of the toy or situation the response was coded as a ‘situation’
attribution and given a score of ‘1’ (e.g.. "The trampoline doesn't have any
edges."). Some explanations referred to both personal traits and situational
factors and were coded as ‘interactions’ and given a score of ‘0.5’. See SI
Appendix Table S9 for a list of example responses by category. Reliability
coding was conducted on 16% of the responses by a 2nd coder who was blind
to condition and inter-rater reliability was high (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.967, p
<.001). Coded explanation responses for each participant were summed to
provide a ‘situation’ attribution score for each participant.
Analyses. All analyses in both experiments were performed using the
R statistical programming language (72). Preliminary analyses revealed no
effect of block shape, doll name, toy, or the order in which the dolls played.
Linear regression models found no effect of gender of the participants or
the experimenter in either experiment (see SI Appendix Tables S3 and S11).
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